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vAbstract
International science and technology cooperation has become increasingly important when
facing the global challenges such as climate change, food security and health issues. Both
Norwegian and EU strategies stress the importance of pooling our financial, infrastructure and
knowledge resources together. The Joint Programming Initiatives (JPI) are bottom-up,
member state driven initiatives set up to coordinate national efforts and pooling together
resources to handle the challenges.
This thesis is an explorative case study of Norwegian participation in three of the JPIs, with a
focus on national motives and funding structures. The central issues from the principal-agent
framework, goal conflict, moral hazard and adverse selection, have been used to highlight
some of the governance challenges. I used document studies and semi structured interviews of
representatives from the Ministry and Agency level to collect my empirical data.
My studies show that the motives for participation are linked to social, scientific and
economical drivers. For one of my cases economic return and strengthening the
competitiveness of national research communities was an important driver, for two of my
cases the chance to influence the European research agenda is an important motive, and
access to knowledge and facing the grand challenges together is important for all my cases.
There are slight differences in the governance structures of each JPI, and the funding
arrangements mirror this. The case with the strongest strategic influence motive intends to use
mostly institutionalized funding, while the two others have only just started to tackle this
issue.
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11 Introduction
The topic of this thesis is the motivation for and the funding arrangements of European
Science Technology and Innovation (STI) cooperation within the European Research Area
(ERA) framework, with a specific focus on the Joint programming initiatives (JPI). The JPI is
an initiative to increase the impact of European research by bringing together national public
research funding to tackle common challenges through cooperation and coordination
(European Commission, 2008b).
The Steering Group on Governance of International Co-operation on Science, Technology
and Innovation for Global Challenges (STIG) have identified five dimensions of governance
that are important for STI cooperation: priority setting, funding and spending arrangements,
intellectual property, putting STI into practice, and capacity building (OECD, 2012). I have
chosen to focus on the two first, priority setting and funding arrangements, because they are
mechanisms that can show how national budgets are spent and who is in control of them.
Through my work at the Research Council of Norway I have first-hand experience from
European R&D programme collaboration and the challenges found in trying to develop a
governance system that is acceptable for different national systems. Therefore this is also an
issue that I am personally interested in.
International cooperation is becoming more and more important, and both Norwegian and EU
strategies stress the importance of pooling our resources together; financial, infrastructure and
knowledge; to face mutual challenges (European Commission, 2011b; Meld. St. 30 (2008-
2009), 2009). In their report for the European commission on Drivers of International
collaboration in research, Boekholt, Edler, Cunningham, and Flanagan (2009) notes that
traditionally the driver for international science and technology cooperation policy has been
linked to scientific goals of accessing and attracting state of the art knowledge and sharing the
2cost of large infrastructure (Boekholt et al., 2009). With the recent emergence of fast growing
economies like the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) countries, the urgency of global
challenges and the increased worldwide mobility of researchers (Boekholt et al., 2009), they
found that non science policy objectives are becoming more central, and that policy attention
to STI collaboration is:
[…] driven by trade, foreign investment, global influence, the flow of research and
innovation talent etc. At the same time, collaboration is increasingly seen as a contribution
towards or even an essential underpinning of, for instance, education, diplomatic and
development policy (Boekholt et al., 2009, p. 4)
This change can also be seen within EU policy. With the Lisbon strategy in 2000, fostering
international cooperation within science and technology was no longer linked only to science
policy goals but was becoming increasingly linked to societal and economic policy goals
(Edler, 2010; Holzinger, Meyer, & Polt, 2012).
Globally, the so called global or grand challenges have emerged as important drivers for
International STI collaboration (OECD, 2012; The Royal Society, 2011). At the beginning of
the Swedish EC presidency in 2009, the Lund declaration stated that “Europe must focus on
the grand challenges of our time” (European Union, 2009). In line with the new EU strategy
Europe 2020 that was launched in 2010, the new EU Framework Programme HORIZON
2020 has the societal or grand challenges as one of its three key priorities.
1.1 Joint programming initiatives
The development of the European Research Area (ERA) that started in 2000 opened up for
new networking and coordination activities for funding agencies and ministries on a national
level, namely the ERA-NETs and Article 169/185 initiatives (Edler, 2010; European
Commission, 2000). The move towards a more coordinated European research policy that
3came with the Lisbon strategy and the ERA has put pressure on national systems of research
and innovation to cooperate. The ERA would give the European Commission (EC) “[…]more
autonomy to initiate projects and programmes that directly affect national research actors
and, in addition, would take coordination of National policies more serious.” (Kuhlmann &
Edler, 2003, p. 260)
This increased integration of EC R&D and innovation policy with national R&D and
innovation policies does of course come with governance challenges. In 2008, the Ljubljana
process was launched to tackle this concern and to revitalise the ERA. As noted on the EC
web page the goals of the process were "[…] to develop a common vision and effective
governance of the European Research Area" (European Commission, 2011a). One of the
initiatives the EC launched as part of the process was Joint Programming. The concept of
Joint Programming Initiatives (JPI) is that by coordinating national STI activities and pooling
resources together member and associated states will be better able to handle the grand
challenges of our time, such as climate change, food security and health issues. Participation
in the JPIs is voluntary and the number of participants in each programme will vary.
The JPIs intervene in the national research and innovation system in a way that cooperation
schemes like the ERA-Nets or the Framework Programme do not (European Commission,
2008b). They are member state driven and unlike the ERA-Nets and Art. 185s the themes are
not chosen by the Commission, but they have to be approved by the High Level Group for
Joint Programming (GPC) (2010a). The knowledge gained through the JPIs will help
authorities and policy makers design measures to tackle the societal challenges. The JPIs are
broad thematic endeavours that in Norway will affect several ministries, STI programmes and
budgets (Research Council of Norway, 2012). The JPIs have the potential to affect the
national systems on all levels.
41.2 Research questions
With the coordination of national strategies and resources to tackle common challenges within
the framework of the, JPI there is a tension between national and international interests that it
would be interesting to explore. In 2011, the Research Council of Norway (2011) launched a
new international strategy with several interesting points that show that they are preparing the
system for the increased focus on international cooperation. One is the possible restructuring
of existing funding schemes to align them with the JPIs and other coordinated initiatives; the
other is an enhanced focus on internationalisation in the whole of the organisation. As one of
the five main actions point out “All of the Research Council’s activities, -programmes, open
competitive arenas, special initiatives, institution-oriented measures and other forms of
support- must include clearly-defined objectives and plans for international cooperation.”
(Research Council of Norway, 2011, p. 6) The Research Council of Norway’s strategy also
states that: “As research funding administrator we must adapt national funding schemes to
developments at the international level, seek to establish easy-to-use international funding
schemes and serve as a meeting place for the research establishment.” (Research Council of
Norway, 2011, p. 6)
The aim of my case studies is to see how the system handles this increased focus on
international cooperation and the governance issues that it raises. However, because the JPIs
are in an early phase, I can only hope to highlight some of the issues.
My research questions are:
o What motives come into play when policy makers decide to take part in the JPIs?
o How are the national budgets used in cooperation with other countries in the JPI?
51.3 Structure
This thesis is divided into five chapters. The first one gives a short background and rationale
for my thesis, and presents the research questions.
Chapter two is an introduction to the principal-agent framework and the central issues of
moral hazard, goal conflict and adverse selection, and also gives a short introduction to the
Norwegian system, international science and technology cooperation and the background and
context of the thesis.
In chapter three I describe my research process and give a summary of the methodological
challenges I’ve encountered throughout my work with the thesis.
Chapter four covers my findings, giving a presentation of the JPIs in general as well as of the
three cases I’ve studied specifically, before I move on to discuss my findings in view of the
research questions and theory presented in chapter two.
The fifth and last chapter is the conclusion.
62 Theoretical perspectives and
background.
Guston introduced the principal-agent theory to science policy research “to reinterpret
generic science policy problems” (Braun & Guston, 2003, p. 304). According to Guston
(1996) “[…] the problem of science policy is the problem of delegation.” (p. 229) This view
corresponds with the issues that I want to examine. A lot of the literature that applies
principal-agent theory to examine science policy deals with the specific issue of research
councils and funding agencies as intermediaries between policy makers and the science
community (Braun & Guston, 2003). The two problems central to principal-agent theory are
adverse selection and moral hazard. Adverse selection deals with the dilemma of choice, how
to choose the best agents for the task. Moral hazard deals with control and how the principal
can know if the agent does what they have been delegated to do (Braun & Guston, 2003). To
show the wider institutional context, I will complement the principal-agent theory with
elements of institutional and organisational theory.
2.1 Principal-agent framework
The principal-agent theory was initially developed within the New Institutional Economics to
understand transaction costs between a principal and an agent (Braun, 1993). It has later
become a predominant approach to discussing issues of delegation in different fields of
political science (Braun & Guston, 2003). At the centre of principal-agent theory is a social
relationship between the principal and agent that includes an exchange of resources. In the
case of science policy one can say that “[…] the state is the principal that requires the agent -
science – to perform certain tasks because the principal is not capable to perform them
directly.” (Guston, 1996, p. 230) The relationship between the state and science is mediated
through grants and public funding for research. This relationship can be described as a
7contractual one, where the rights and obligations of each actor is specified (Guston, 1996). It
is the structure of science policy, the “processes and institutions” (Guston, 1996, p. 230) that
is investigated with the principal-agent theory. Following Guston’s argumentation, the
framework is well suited to examine the practice and implementation of science policy, and
not just the policy itself.
There are three central dilemmas in principal-agent relations. The first one is that the agent’s
own interests, strategies and agendas might conflict with the principal’s, which is known as
the goal conflict (Gulbrandsen, 2005; Guston, 1996; Shove, 2003; Van der Meulen, 1998).
The second is the problem of information asymmetry, meaning that the principal does not
have all the information regarding the agent or the task itself, making it difficult to select the
appropriate agent. This is known as adverse selection (Braun & Guston, 2003; Guston, 1996).
The third dilemma is that of moral hazard. How does the principal make sure that the agent
does as agreed? Also, within the delegation from principal to agent there is not only an
incentive to perform the required task; there is also an opportunity to shirk or cheat and twist
the task to fit one’s own agenda (Braun & Guston, 2003).
In his article from 1993: Who Governs Intermediary Agencies? Principal-Agent relations in
research Policy-Making; Braun introduced a triadic structure to the framework. According to
Braun (1993), political principal-agent relationships are too complex for the dyadic system,
especially when it comes to the policy maker / funding agency relationship. The funding
agency is an intermediary that is responsible for the implementation of the science policy. By
adding a third actor, the science community, Braun shows how the third party also influences
the agent. For the agent to be able to perform it has to be accepted by the third party, and the
principal’s assessment of the agent is influenced by the third party’s satisfaction or
dissatisfaction with the agent (Braun, 1993). To achieve this, the agent has to cooperate with
the third party and accept some of the demands from them. The agent even has to defend
8these demands towards the principal, giving the third party what Braun (1993) calls “secret
defining power” (p. 141).
The relationship between the principal and agent changes: “While the agent was employed to
foster the interests of the principal with regard to the performance of a third party the social
system thus institutionalised forces the agent to promote the interest of the third party.”
(Braun, 1993, p. 141) In effect the agent ends up with two principals and all three actors are
interdependent of each other to fulfil their goals. Braun notes that this can give the agent more
autonomy and room to play one principal against the other, which in turn can increase the
moral hazard dilemma for the principals (Braun, 1993). The triadic relationship could be
conceptualized by two levels of principal agent relationships where the intermediary is both
agent and principal, but this would not adequately show the influence of the third party on the
principal (Braun & Guston, 2003).
Other researchers such as Shove (2003) and Klerkx and Leeuwis (2008) point out that the
principal-agent framework is less suited for “[…] analysing the complex multilateral
relationships between principals and agents, […]”(p. 194) They claim that because the
framework focuses mainly on bilateral or trilateral relationships, the science policy has a
tendency to be lifted from the context. Shove (2003) argues that “Exclusive focus on the mode
of delegation between one principal and one agent fosters the illusion that principals are
influential in their own right, not in context.” (p. 379)
There are other relationships and informal contact points that complicate the use of principal –
agent theory. Klerkx and Leeuwis (2008) mention “[…] multiple principals, the mitigating
role of several intermediary bodies, and the gap between principals’ formal requirements and
workable procedures in practice […]” (p. 194) All these complications are present when
looking at the JPIs. However, as Klerkx & Leeuwis (2008) notes the issues identified by the
9principal agent framework (goal conflict, adverse selection, moral hazard) are still valuable
tools to analyse the dynamics of policy, selection and control in science policy.
2.1.1 Goal conflict
One solution used by intermediary organisations to limit the potential goal conflict and
information asymmetry between the actors, is to include the third party in the selection
process. Through peer review and scientific boards the interests of the science community are
institutionalised within the intermediary organisations. The policy is taken care of by the
constitutional mission or goal of the intermediary mediated by the contract with the principal
(Braun, 1998). In other words: political funding agencies have to keep in line with the goals
of their ministry, strategic funding agencies have to show that they are committed to problem-
solving within their field of specialisation and science- based funding agencies have to
support the knowledge development in promising scientific areas. At the same time, the
scientific quality of the research is upheld by the science community (Braun, 1998).
The systems the actors are in also influence their relationships and goals. Funding is not just
money, the funding helps to structure the system and the norms of research (Benner &
Sandström, 2000; Braun, 1998). Braun (1998) argues that it is through “[…] the
organizational, financial and infrastructural environment […]” (p. 808) that access is
provided for political or societal influence over science. Access to resources and appropriate
infrastructure influences the choices of individual scientists, research institutions and even
whole disciplines. Those that have ample resources will dominate the research process and
others will strive to emulate them. This means that economic capital “[…] may have
immediate repercussions on the power positions of scientists in the scientific system.” (Braun,
1998, p. 809), and as Braun notes, those who distribute funds can, to some extent, influence
who will investigate what.
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2.1.2 Adverse selection
The dilemma of adverse selection is the dilemma of who should do the research. According to
Guston,
Decisions about the choice of agents fall within the following, among other,
dimensions: military versus civilian research; intramural versus extramural research;
mission or programmatic research versus disciplinary or unprogrammatic research; large
firms versus small firms; and peer-review versus earmarked (or pork-barrel) research.
(Guston, 1996, p. 233)
These dimensions are not exclusive and the decisions in one dimension include the others.
The decision of mission versus disciplinary can also include the dimension of peer-review
versus earmarked. The adverse selection includes the first dilemma of goal conflict. The
alignment of goals between principal and potential agents, and what instruments of
monitoring and control are available, are important questions when it comes to choosing the
agents (Guston, 1996). It is in the nature of the principal- agent relationship that the
principal’s lack of information and expertise makes it difficult to select the appropriate agent.
This is one of the reasons why policy makers set up intermediary agencies. The intermediaries
are closer to the source of information and, as illustrated earlier, to some degree
institutionalise the information by including the science community in the agency (Braun,
1993).
2.1.3 Moral hazard
When grants are given to a project the principal expects the work to be done. The work itself
may be initiated by the agent or be directly delegated by the principal. However, the actual
research that is done might take unexpected turns and veer away from the original plan (Van
der Meulen, 1998). This so called shirking is a problem for the funding agencies or
programmes, even more so if they are goal or mission driven, and they might respond with
11
stricter monitoring of their projects. However, agencies that are more open to the autonomy of
the agent will be more tolerant of shirking. Shirking can even be welcomed, as it can open up
new areas of research and give unexpected results. According to Van der Meulen (1998),
some even “[…] welcome shirking as an indication of good research and sensible project
management.” (p. 399) This space for desired shirking opens up for real shirking, where the
agent might intentionally shift the direction of the research to prepare for another proposal or
even do work for another project that is not covered by the contract (Van der Meulen, 1998).
This is reminiscent of what Shove (2003) refers to as the agent’s own programming, and
shows how the agent’s shirking can influence the intermediary in Braun’s (1993) triadic
system.
When you break it down to the basics, the principal can either monitor or trust the agent, and
the agent can either abide by the contract or defect (Guston, 1996; Van der Meulen, 1998).
Monitoring of agents takes effort and comes with costs. Incentives and monitoring systems
are needed to overcome the information asymmetry. When it comes to science there is an
incentive for scientists to monitor each other; they are both producers and consumers of the
results and they have an interest in the knowledge and technology that is being developed. In
addition, user-involvement, network relations and productivity have become important
assessment criteria within some funding agencies and funding programmes, and this
influences the monitoring as well as the selection (Van der Meulen, 1998).
2.1.4 Trust
Included in the principal-agent dilemmas of goal conflict, adverse selection and moral hazard
is what Van der Meulen (1998) has set up as a fourth characteristic, that of trust. According to
Van der Meulen, trust is often neglected in principal-agent literature, but he argues that it is
important for the long term stability and continuity of principal-agent relations. I have
12
included it here because the level of trust between the actors in different national systems will
not be the same, and as argued by Van der Meulen (1998) this will influence the shape of the
national systems and international cooperation.
Since the early days of science policy, trust has been one of the major ways in which public
funding has entered the scientific system (Braun, 2003; Guston, 1996; Van der Meulen,
1998). This science push model was supported by the linear model of innovation which was
the predominant after the Second World War1, where research eventually leads to
development and production (Braun, 2003; Kline & Rosenberg, 1986). Science policy is left
to the scientific institutions and scientists, and the dilemmas of the principal-agent framework
do not really apply. The principal exerts no cost or effort on selection or monitoring, and the
agents can pursue their scientific activities without considering external criteria. In this system
policy-makers trust the scientific community to deliver the knowledge that society needs in
the long term (Braun, 2003). Institutional funding and curiosity driven (basic research) project
funding without obligations indicate that science funding with a high level of trust is still a
part of national funding systems, even if this blind delegation is no longer the main channel of
public funding to science. Van der Meulen (1998) points out that trust is also important to
stabilise the system in other modes of funding.
Trust is part of the moral hazard for the principal, and because the actors depend on each
other, the agent has to trust the principal as well. It is more likely that the agents will perform
well if they can trust the principals to reward them when they comply, for example with
continued funding and a certain degree of autonomy.
1 The Linear model of innovation has to a large degree been discarded. The innovation process is nowadays more
seen as a complex set of interactions and feedback best described by the Chain link model of innovation
developed by Kline and Rosenberg (1986).
13
2.1.5 Programmes
In the principal-agent framework, programmes are seen to be used by principals to coordinate
and organise multiple agents. A funding agency (principal) initiates a programme to target a
specific policy goal and researchers (agent) shape their activities so they can receive funding
(Shove, 2003). According to Shove (2003), “[..,] programmes appear to provide principals
with a way of directing research agendas and achieving certain sorts of added value and
creative synergy” (p. 376) However, Shove (2003) also points out that: “[..,] the formation of
a realistic and viable programme is already shaped not only by what programme managers
want but what research capacity exists and by the research communities’ active involvement
in programme making.” (p. 376).
Agents relate to several different principals or sources of funding, both national and within the
EU framework. Skilled agents can navigate between different principal-agent relationships.
Shove’s analysis of the EU social environmental research shows that the agents in a way
develop programmes of their own, participating in several programmes and working towards
their own strategies and goals. Agents have their own more or less formal programme (Shove,
2003). This again fits with Braun’s (1993) triadic structure; the programme set up by the
funding agency becomes an intermediary agent between the principal (funding agency) and
third party (scientists), and the success of the programme is partly based on the acceptance of
the third party .
I will now give an introduction to the Norwegian system before I go on to describe the
international and European context of the Joint Programming Initiatives.
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2.2 The Norwegian system and previous research
Norwegian policy makers have noted that research is by nature and tradition international, and
the internationalisation of national research has been an important part of Norwegian science
policy the last decades (Kunnskapsdepartementet, 2008). The EU system is seen as a strategic
tool for Norwegian science policy and the EU Framework Programme is an arena to
compliment and strengthen national research (Kunnskapsdepartementet, 2008)
The book Borderless Knowledge (Gornitzka & Langfeldt, 2008b) presents different studies of
the internationalisation of the Norwegian knowledge system. When looking at all the different
studies in the book, Gornitzka, Gulbrandsen, and Langfeldt (2008) found little tension
attached to the internationalisation patterns of Norway. Cross border activities are becoming
more and more common, but this does not appear to be a controversial issue. They find little
evidence of internationalisation being seen as a threat to national control or scholarly
autonomy in the cases they study. According to Gornitzka et al. (2008), a possible explanation
for this can be the characteristics of the Norwegian case. Norway has a small knowledge
system, a relatively flexible and open economy and stable politics, that “[…] combines
political intervention with economic liberalisation[…].” (Gornitzka et al., 2008, p. 178)
possibly giving Norway the financial capabilities to “[…] internationalize without creating
any obvious national winners and losers.” (Gornitzka et al., 2008, p. 178) And as seen in the
EU strategy, the national authorities encourage international activities.
However, Gornitzka et al. (2008) note that the cases point to a latent tension between different
levels of governance. When it comes to science policy, this tension can for instance be
between the different ambitions and objectives they have regarding how and where they use
public funding for national purposes (Gornitzka et al., 2008). Gornitzka et al. (2008) also note
that an apparent challenge to the national political control over national funds is the increase
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of public funds being channelled through international programmes like the EUs Framework
programme, where there is no national control over funds. However Gornitzka et al. (2008)
once again find little evidence that this lack of national control is seen as an “[…] adequate
argument against the internationalization of R&D.” (p. 180) Instead they note that
Norwegian authorities work to influence the EU R&D policy through different channels and
efforts. These efforts also include an adjustment of national science policies to align with the
EU R&D policy, so that national research communities can take part in the framework
programme (Gornitzka & Langfeldt, 2008a).
In their recent paper: Integration modes in EU research: centrifugal versus coordination of
national research policies, Langfeldt, Godø, Gornitzka, and Kaloudis (2012) give a good
description of the Norwegian governance processes and coordination of participation in the
EU Framework programme. I will give a short summary here. The Norwegian research policy
is organised in accordance with a sector responsibility principle, meaning that each ministry
is responsible for developing national policies within its sector, including research policy and
international collaboration. There is little coordination at the ministerial level, and the
interaction with European science policy follows the same sectorial lines (Langfeldt et al.,
2012).
The Ministry responsible for the overall coordination of the Norwegian Research policy, as
well as formulating the overall strategy, is the Norwegian Ministry of Education and
Research. Since 2005, this ministry has also had the constitutional responsibility for the
Norwegian participation in the EU Framework programme and the ERA. However they have
no authority over the other ministries when it comes to these issues (Langfeldt et al., 2012).
The Ministry of Education and Research has delegated much of this responsibility to the
Research Council of Norway and, again following the sector responsibilities, the Research
Council in practice interacts with the sector ministries individually. (Langfeldt et al., 2012)
16
The ministries share the responsibility for funding the activities and instruments in the
Research Council related to international cooperation. The research council is responsible for
working out the strategy documents for participation in the different Framework programmes.
For the implementation of these strategies the Research Council has to obtain the approval of
the relevant sector ministries and R&D institutions (Langfeldt et al., 2012).
2.3 International STI collaboration
As mentioned in the introduction, policy makers have increasingly begun to see international
cooperation in science and technology as an important part of solving the mutual challenges
society is facing. The communication from the European Commission (2011b) regarding the
new Framework Programme HORIZON 2020 stated that: “Smart investment, notably in
research and innovation, is vital in order to maintain high standards of living while dealing
with pressing societal challenges such as climate change, an ageing population, or the move
towards a more resource-efficient society.” (p. 2)
Recent reports from Boekholt et al. (2009), The Royal Society (2011) and the OECD report
by the Steering Group on Governance of International Co-operation on Science, Technology
and Innovation for Global Challenges (STIG) on international cooperation have also
highlighted this increased focus on societal challenges and the shift from the purely scientific
goals to societal and economic goals. The STIG report states that “Global challenges call for
co-operation on a global scale in order to create a public good or protect the global
commons.” (OECD, 2012, p. 26)
Many of the challenges that are seen as global challenges are not new; food crises, epidemics,
pollution and so on have been around for a while (OECD, 2012). What the STIG report says
is new is the complexity of the source of the challenges; many of them are interlinked and
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they are produced by a variety of actors that are cross national and interdisciplinary. For
example, global climate change and loss of biodiversity can lead to global health challenges
and food shortage. Also, the possible solutions for one problem can lead to a worsening of
others (OECD, 2012). According to the STIG report (OECD, 2012) there is an urgency to the
global challenges. The processes behind some of them are expected to reach so called tipping
points, points of no return, which”[…] may lead to irreversible damages to the complex
systems that are essential for our survival and welfare.” (OECD, 2012, p. 13)
Science, technology and innovation play important roles when it comes to tackling the global
challenges (OECD, 2012). Scientific endeavours both highlight the consequences of the
challenges to nature and society, and produces new knowledge on how to handle them.
Technological development and innovations can provide new solutions for industry and
society’s pressing problems (OECD, 2012).
The EC has also recognised the cross border and interdisciplinary nature of the challenges. In
the communication Horizon 2020 - The Framework Programme for Research and Innovation
(European Commission, 2011b), they state that to tackle the societal challenges:
A challenge-based approach will bring together resources and knowledge across
different fields, technologies and disciplines, including social sciences and the humanities.
This will cover activities from research to market with a new focus on innovation-related
activities, such as piloting, demonstration, test-beds, and support for public procurement and
market uptake. (European Commission, 2011b, p. 5)
They have also brought together all the existing union research and innovation funding
schemes into HORIZON 2020. This includes the Framework Programme for research, the
innovation activities in the Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme and the
European Institute of Innovation and technology (European Commission, 2011b). The key
priorities of HORIZON 2020 are Excellent Science, Industrial Leadership and Societal
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Challenges. These priorities coincide with the priorities of Europe 2020 and the Innovation
Union (European Commission, 2011b). Within societal challenges the funding will be focused
on: Health, demographic change and wellbeing; Food security, sustainable agriculture, marine
and maritime research and the bio-economy; Secure, clean and efficient energy; Smart, green
and integrated transport; Climate action, resource efficiency and raw materials; Inclusive,
innovative and secure societies (European Commission, 2011b).
2.4 European Research Area
The European Research Area (ERA) is the concept of an internal European market for
research. The free circulation of knowledge, technology and researchers is to be reached
through the effective coordination of national and regional activities and initiatives (European
Commission, 2007).
2.4.1 Fragmentation
The main objective of the ERA as set out in the communication Towards a European
Research Area (European Commission, 2000) was that the value added by research to
Europe’s Economic, societal and environmental goals should be maximised. One of the main
rationales behind the development of the ERA is the concept of fragmentation. The first ERA
communication from the EC states:
Above the European research effort as it stands today is no more than the simple
addition of the efforts of the 15 Member States and the Union. This fragmentation, isolation
and compartmentalisation of national research efforts and systems and the disparity of
regulatory and administrative systems only serve to compound the impact of lower global
investment in knowledge. (European Commission, 2000, p. 7)
This fragmentation was seen as one of the main barriers for cross border cooperation. Other
barriers mentioned are the ones between academy and industry, between disciplines and a
19
general lack of a European policy on research (European Commission, 2008a). However, I
will focus on fragmentation because it is the main driver behind the joint programming
initiatives (European Commission, 2008b). The Green paper (European Commission, 2007)
and the report from the ERA Expert group (European Commission, 2008a) emphasise five
negative consequences of fragmentation, for instance: “ 3. Duplication of funding between
national/regional programmes dispersing resources, losing spillovers and making Europe’s
global role sub-critical;” and “4. Lack of European perspective and transnational coherence
in reforms undertaken at a national level;” (p. 13) The ERA Expert group point out that these
consequences are system level failures, meaning failures at the governance level of research,
thus implying a lack of coordination and cooperation or even both among institutions
supporting research (European Commission, 2008a).
Biermann, Pattberg, van Asselt, and Zelli (2009) point out that “All global governance
structures2 are fragmented to some degree; that is, they consist of distinct parts that are
hardly ever fully interlinked and integrated.” (p. 17, my footnote) The opposite, non-
fragmented or universal architecture would be one where all the countries involved in an issue
would follow the same rules and regulations, participate in the same decision-making
processes and even agree on a common set of commitments (Biermann et al., 2010). This
more integrated governance architecture seems to promise more efficiency and effectiveness
when it comes to solving issues. However, Biermann et al. (2010) also note that there is a
potential benefit of a variety of agreements and approaches within an architecture or
framework.
Langfeldt et al. (2012) are concerned that the new ERA instruments like the JPIs and Art. 185,
can cause further fragmentation in the European research system. The new instruments
2 The term is here defined as “the overarching system of public and private institutions that are valid or active in
a given issue area of world politics.” (Biermann et al., 2010, p. 15)
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demand considerable funding over a long period in addition to the national Framework
Programme contribution. They also point out that there are limits to how complex and diverse
systems the decision making bodies in small countries can handle. The concern is that the
flexible geometry of the new instruments will divide the system between those that can and
are willing to pay and those that are not able or willing (Langfeldt et al., 2012). Edler, (2010)
on the other hand, sees the development of new instruments and joined up actions as a move
towards a more flexible coordination of science policies. Unlike Langfeldt et al. (2012), he
finds that the new larger tool box for R&D funding has been a catalyst for the development of
explicit internationalisation strategies by ministries and funding agencies (Edler, 2010). He
refers to a country survey by CREST where
[…] 10 out of 22 countries reporting on internationalization strategies claimed to
have a comprehensive strategy in place, three of which being part of a general globalization
strategy, seven being part of their respective S&T-strategies. Apparently, eight countries were
in the process of defining a strategy. (Edler, 2010, p. 6)
However, Edler (2010) notes that it still remains to be seen if the high strategic aspirations are
actually finalised and implemented.
The CREST survey also showed that the drivers for the internationalisation strategies were
very similar:
In general, the most important drivers are: (1) strengthening (domestic) excellence
through access to existing excellence and facilities abroad and through attracting talent into
the domestic systems (inward mobility), (2) preparing the ground for domestic innovations to
be marketed abroad, and (3) contributing to the solution of global problems. (Edler, 2010, p.
6)
Edler (2010) sees this as part of the beginning of a paradigm shift within international science
and technology collaboration. In their report for the European Commission on Drivers of
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International collaboration in research, Boekholt et al. (2009) distinguish this shift as the
move from a narrow STI cooperation paradigm to a broad STI cooperation paradigm. The
narrow paradigm aims to achieve research excellence and attract resources to enhance the
national STI capabilities. The broader paradigm aims to improve national competitiveness,
promote development aid, enhance diplomacy and tackle global challenges (Boekholt et al.,
2009).
A challenge that arises with the broad STI collaboration paradigm is the coordination of
policies. Apart from large initiatives that had to be coordinated, STI collaboration was for a
long time something that the science community organised themselves. However, with the
competitiveness and the global challenges drivers, policy makers have begun to steer
researchers towards specific themes and countries, according to national policy and strategies
(Boekholt et al., 2009). This can become a source of tension. As Lundvall and Borrás (2005)
note; area-specific policymakers tend to identify with and focus on the needs of their sectors
and therefore take less interest in global objectives. Both the STIG report (OECD, 2012) and
the report by Boekholt et al. (2009) highlight the need for better coordination of the STI
policies. Boekholt et al. (2009) point out that the narrow and broad paradigms coexist, overlap
and interact at varying degrees from country to country.
2.4.2 Coordination
With a complex set of drivers, two paradigms and new flexible combinations for joint
programming, Edler (2010) notes that a clear understanding of the “[…] nature of
coordination and the institutional challenges associated with it” (p. 7) is needed to reap the
benefits of efficiency and effectiveness. Even if the concept of coordination is used a lot in
policy rhetoric, according to Edler (2010) we really do not have a common understanding of
what is meant. Often coordination is confused with collaboration.
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A general understanding of collaboration can be “[…] ‘to work jointly on an activity or
project’” (Edler, 2010, p. 7) and a general definition of coordination is “[…] to bring
different elements (of a complex activity or organization) onto a ‘harmonious’ or efficient
relationship” (Edler, 2010, p. 8) Integration is also a concept that often is mentioned with or
instead of coordination. However, where integration is a process of combining structures and
processes to form a new whole, in coordination the various elements being brought together
are still autonomous. Following this argument, joint activities are collaboration if they are
focused on concrete activities or integration if they are focused on a structural merger.
Edler (2010) defines international policy coordination as “[…] to undertake activities in order
to adjust and combine individual activities in a certain area so that they better interact and
synergize with activities of other countries in the same area.” (p. 8) Coordination can range
from the mutual sharing of information, minor adjustments to national programmes to
concrete collaboration activities and full integration of for example infrastructure. The new
flexible instruments allow for the full range of coordination and the understanding that one
size does not fit all.
ERA is now based on 27 different national research systems, and as far as it benefits the EU
and the individual countries, these will remain distinct and build on their own individual
strengths (European Commission, 2012). However, to complete the ERA by 2014 as called
for by the European council, there is still a lot to be done (European Commission, 2012).
There is still a need for them to “[…] be more open to each other and to the world, more
inter-connected and more inter-operable.” (European Commission, 2012, p. 3) According to
the communication (European Commission, 2012) on a Reinforced European Research Area
Partnership for Excellence and Growth, the most efficient and pragmatic way of achieving
this is through a reinforced ERA partnership.
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2.4.3 ERA instruments for cooperation
The EC communication on partnership (European Commission, 2011c) gives a good
overview of the different forms of partnering that have been developed to achieve the ERA.
There are several instruments for joined-up actions within the European system. The existing
EU level instruments and concepts that bring together the European and national level in
Public-Public- Partnerships are ERA-NET, ERA-NET Plus, Article 185 initiatives, SET
(Strategic Energy Technology) Plan, Europe INNOVA/PROINNO Europe and the JPIs
(European Commission, 2011c). I will here focus on the instruments; they can all be used
within a JPI. The ERA-NETs were first implemented in Framework Programme 6 (FP6), and
their aim is to develop and strengthen the coordination of national and regional research
programmes by providing a framework for national and regional programme owners (funding
agencies, ministries, and so on) to coordinate activities and develop joint activities, for
instance joint calls for transnational proposals (ERA-LEARN, 2011). The coordination and
management activities in an ERA-NET receive funding from the EU. However, the joint
projects themselves are funded by the national budgets. The joint calls follow the principle of
variable geometry where each country’s involvement is based on their problems or
capabilities (Harrap & Boden, 2011).
ERA-NET Plus is a development of the ERA-NET scheme where the joint calls include top-
up funds from the EU. There has to be an existing commitment to transnational joint calls,
and the ERA-NET Plus acts as an incentive to launch joint calls (Harrap & Boden, 2011).
This is probably also why most of the ERA-NET Plus actions have been developed by
existing ERA-NETs. The duration of an ERA-NET is normally between three to five years.
Sometimes they continue under a new contract, some even become self-sustaining networks
that continue to work without EU funding (Harrap & Boden, 2011). The ERA-NET Plus, on
the other hand, is set up for only one joint call. The ERA-NETs started off as being bottom-up
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in nature, but in Framework Programme 7 (FP7) they evolved to became more top-down,
answering the more strategic element to coordinate actions. With the ERA-NET Plus there
were even more incentives to match ERA-NET actions to the overall strategies within the
Framework Programme (Harrap & Boden, 2011).
This has now been taken a step further; the future ERA-NET scheme is emerging as
combination of ERA-NET and ERA-NET Plus. Article 20 of the partial general approach on
the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council establishing
Horizon 2020 (Council of the European Union, 2012) states that:
Public-public partnerships may be supported either within, or across, the priorities set
out in Article 5(2), in particular through:
(a) an ERA-NET instrument using grants to support public-public partnerships in their
preparation, establishment of networking structures, design, implementation and
coordination of joint activities as well as Union topping up of no more than one joint call a
year and of actions of a transnational nature; (Council of the European Union, 2012, p. 19)
This implies that all the future ERA-NETs will have one substantial call with top-up funding.
This in turn means that the schemes focus is less on the finance of networks and more on the
top-up funding of transnational calls (Niehoff, 2012). This is further supported by: “For the
purposes of point (a), top-up funding shall be conditional on a prior indicative financial
commitments in cash or in kind of the participating entities to the joint calls and
actions.”(Council of the European Union, 2012, p. 19)
Because of the current economic situation with tight budgets, this is an important incentive for
cooperation when “in kind” or so called Institutional Funding can trigger top-up from the EU.
The article 185 (formerly 169) initiatives open up for the participation of the EU in joint
implementation of national research and development programmes, or parts of them. The
objective is integration rather than a coordination of national programmes in a jointly defined
25
programme. The EU provides top-up funding of the joint programme. Currently there are four
article 185 initiatives that have been adopted, and unlike the ERA-NETs the article 185s have
to have a dedicated structure like a secretariat or agency to run it (Harrap & Boden, 2011).
2.4.4 Funding models
It has been estimated that 85% of the European civil public research is spent and programmed
at the national level (OECD, 2012), and as described above there have been several
instruments designed to coordinate and pool these resources together. As stated by the High
Level Group on Joint Programming (2010b)“[..,] it should be noted that the expression
‘funding of Cross-border Research’ is not synonymous of ‘Transfer of National Funds Across
Borders’.” (p. 33) Several different approaches to the funding of cross-border research have
been proposed. I will here describe the three main categories of funding tools: real common
pot, virtual common pot and mixed mode common pot.
The real common pot is where national funds are pooled together in a jointly administered
pot. Projects are funded based on their success in the evaluation of proposals and the
nationality of the applicant is irrelevant. This results in a cross border flow of funds. The
Framework Programme is an example of a real common pot programme. The real common
pot can be difficult to set up because it can seem to clash with national interests, there has to
be an agreed system for determining contributions, eligible costs, overheads and so on, and
national legislation can make it illegal to transfer funds across borders, thereby excluding
some countries (High Level Group on Joint Programming, 2010b).
The virtual common pot is where countries and regions pay for their own participants.
National rules are followed and there is no cross border flow of funds. This makes it easier for
the financial planning for national funding bodies. The disadvantages with virtual common
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pot can be that some proposals approved for funding may be declined due to a lack of
available national contributions (High Level Group on Joint Programming, 2010b).
Mixed mode pot is a blend of the two others. It is designed to counter the “Potential conflict
between the funding of “excellence” and available national contributions”. (High Level
Group on Joint Programming, 2010b, p. 39) Part of the call budget is earmarked as a real
common pot to compensate for this mismatch between available national funds and the budget
requests of successful proposals (High Level Group on Joint Programming, 2010b).
Virtual common pot is the main form of funding model used in ERA-NETs and article 185s.
A few ERA-NETs have tried out real common pot, and the mixed mode pot seems to be the
most common in the ERA-NET Plus actions (High Level Group on Joint Programming,
2010b) As can be seen by the presentation of the funding models, there are many legal and
practical obstacles to cross border research cooperation. According to the EC it is not only the
differences between national funding rules and selection processes that make it difficult, it is
also a question of political will both when it comes to the alignment of policy and how much
of the national budget they are willing to spend on cross border research (European
Commission, 2012).
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3 Research method
Because I am interested in the processes and institutions of science policy, the aim of my
thesis is neither to verify nor to generate new theory, but rather to use the theory as an
instrument to analyse my cases. This is a multiple case study where I aim to use the cases to
give insight into an issue.
3.1.1 Research design
I have followed the simplified model of research as outlined by Punch (2005, p. 39)
 framing the research in terms of research question
 determining what data are necessary to answer those questions
 designing research to collect and analyse those data
 using the data to answer the questions
Starting with the research questions:
o What motives come into play when policy makers decide to take part in the JPIs?
o How are the national budgets used in cooperation with other countries in the JPI?
A how question can be answered by several methods, Yin (2009) suggests experiments,
history and case study. My focus on the contemporary rules out history, and the fact that the
relevant behaviour and processes I want to study cannot be manipulated by a researcher
makes an experiment out of the question. This leaves a case study. My other research question
is what Yin (2009) refers to as an exploratory what question. To answer this type of question,
several research methods can be used, among them case study. Based on my combination of
research questions and these arguments a case study seemed the most appropriate method.
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Also, the type of data that I found necessary to answer my questions; document studies and
interviews; lead me to do a case study. Again according to Yin (2009), “[..,] the case study’s
unique strength is its ability to deal with a full variety of evidence – documents, artifacts,
interviews and observations [-]” (p. 11) Yin (2009) also states the importance of theory as
part of the research design to determine the choice of data to collect and strategies for
analysing them.
I have chosen to use the principal-agent framework as my main theory, since the issues I
focus on in my analysis of the cases are central principal-agent issues. Therefore I have used
the framework and literary review to identify the boundaries of my cases (Yin, 2009). My unit
of analysis is the motives and rationales for three of the JPIs and the governance structures
surrounding the funding decisions both nationally and in the JPI. I also used the framework to
identify informants to interview; I chose representatives that are in a principal-agent
relationship. It was important for me to get different perspectives on the cases. The JPIs are
all quite new and my first, original case was chosen for its maturity and the fact that there had
already been done a wider case study on it earlier that I could use as background. The two
other cases were chosen because they both are quite different from the first case and each
other. All three cases will be presented in chapter four.
3.1.2 Reflexivity
“All perception is to an extent shaped by the preconception and purposes of the
observer” (Robson, 1998, p. 58)
What Robson (1998) implies is that what is seen depends on more than just what is looked at.
Because I work at the Research Council of Norway and my cases are related to my place of
work, it is important for me to clarify researcher’s bias and be clear about my own past
experiences and relationship with some of the informants (Creswell, 2007). Governance
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issues related to European STI cooperation have been and will be an important part of my
work at the Research Council. However, because this is an exploratory thesis and my aim is to
highlight issues and not prove a hypothesis I do not consider this a problem. Rather, my past
experience has made it easier for me to identify relevant questions to ask in the interviews and
also connect the information gained. I have in the past worked closely with two of my
informants. Three others are colleagues that I have a passing acquaintance with, who work in
a different division of the Research council than I have.
Having worked with a European STI programme I have some tacit knowledge and experience
within this field. This made it easy for my informants within the Research Council to refer to
the tacit knowledge we share. I also believe that because I came from within the system it was
easy for my informants in the ministries to trust me; a few times I was surprised by the
frankness of the answers. However, this closeness to my cases and informants was also a
challenge, because I had to try to come into the interviews with an open mind and not let my
own experiences colour them. I also think that my experience from working in the Research
Council means that I understand the language my informants use. I found it easy to identify
and get in contact with my informants, and they were all quick to respond and set aside time
for an interview.
I tried to hold the interviews in the form of a conversation, and it was interesting to discover
that this actually worked best with the informants that I did not have a prior relationship with.
One reason for this might be that I had to establish a bit of rapport with the informants that I
didn’t know and this small talk helped establish a good interview environment. With the first
informants, that are colleagues of mine, this small talk had taken place before the interview
situation and therefore I had not managed to establish a conversational environment and they
waited more for questions to prompt them than the others. However as I became aware of this
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I took care to include some small talk at the beginning of the interviews I had with colleagues
and this lead to a better flow in the interview.
3.1.3 Validity
Creswell (2007) considers validation in qualitative research “[…] an attempt to assess the
“accuracy” of the findings, as best described by the researcher and the participants. This
view also suggests that any report of research is a representation by the author” (pp. 206-
207) This view and that of others (Punch, 2005; Yin, 2009) suggests that researchers need to
use validation strategies to document the reliability of their research. I have chosen to use
multiple sources to strengthen the validity of my study (Yin, 2009). Occasionally, some of my
informants would refer to tacit knowledge instead of answering my questions. Therefore I had
to devise a strategy to prompt them to tell and not hint. The interviews were all done in
Norwegian and the quotes used in this thesis are translated by me. This means that their
translation could be coloured by my interpretation of the responses (Punch, 2005). To make
my translation more reliable I have had a third party review them.
3.1.4 Data collection and reliability
I have chosen to use interviews as a central part of my case studies because I wanted the
motives and thoughts from the people who are actually dealing with the issues and choosing
how to act in the different situations. All but one of my informants are involved in the
governance of the JPIs, the last informant works with research funding in one of the ministries
and not directly with the JPIs. My informants are from both the ministry and agency levels.
All my interviews were recorded and partially transcribed, and notes were taken throughout. I
dealt with the hand on the door phenomenon by turning on my recorder again to catch the last
interesting comments (Robson, 1998). I chose to have semi structured interviews with a loose
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interview guide that had a list of topics that I wanted the interview to cover. Also, my
interview guide evolved after the first interviews as there were issues that emerged in the first
interviews that I chose to include in the later ones. This of course raises the issue of reliability
(Robson, 1998). To remedy this I have taken care to document what issues came up in what
interview and how my interview guide changed.
My interviews took place over two months and were all held either in the informant’s office
or a meeting room at their place of work. I had asked for one hour of their time however the
actual interviews varied from approximately 40 minutes to a bit over an hour. Seven of my
interviews were with one individual and the eighth was with two, this means that I had eight
interviews and nine informants. In the one interview, it was my informant that wanted another
individual to take part because it was felt that the other person would be able to give
additional information that was relevant. With this being a group interview it is possible that
the informants influenced each other and this could be a source of bias. The interview quotes I
have chosen to use in my analysis are the ones that best describe each case.
My other source of data was documents, both historical and contemporary. The documents
were both used as background information and to corroborate with information I had collected
from other sources. The documents I have used are Norwegian government documents and
strategies, communications from the EC and governance and strategy documents from the
JPIs; I have also used web pages as sources for background information. It can sometimes be
hard to get access to archive material, but my connection to the research council made it easy
for me to get what I needed. I was even given access to restricted and unfinished documents. I
have used the documents to describe the JPIs and the interviews to see how Norway relates to
them.
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3.1.5 Generalisability
One of the most common critiques of case studies concerns it generalisability; how can you
generalise from a single case? (Punch, 2005; Yin, 2009). Yin (2009) points out that case
studies “[…] are generalizable to theoretical propositions and not to populations or
universes.” (p. 15) However, as Punch (2005) notes, one may not always want to generalise
from a case. Sometimes the intention of a study is to understand an unusual or unique case in
its complexity and entirety and within its context. My aim is not to generalise, but rather to
give insight to an issue. As Punch (2005) and Yin (2009) point out this has a value in itself by
developing better understanding of the issues and pointing to further areas of research. “If we
want to know why something happens, it is important to have a good description of exactly
what happened” (Punch, 2005, p. 15)
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4 Findings and discussion
In this chapter I will first give a description of the JPIs in general, focusing on their funding
and how they are organised in Norway. Then I will give a description of each case; the
background for the JPI, their governance structure, funding structure and how they are
organised in Norway. I will then look at what motives come into play when policy makers
decide to take part in international STI cooperation by looking at the different motives for
Norwegian participation in my three cases, before I go on to look at the funding arrangements
and the issues that they raise.
In my cases there is an interlinking and complex chain of principals and agents. In my
discussion I will focus on the central issues of principal-agent theory; those of goal conflict,
moral hazard, and adverse selection to highlight some of the governance issues related to
funding within the JPIs and the question of how national budgets are used in cooperation with
other countries.
4.1 The Joint Programming Initiatives
With the communication Towards Joint Programming in Research: Working together to
tackle common challenges more effectively (European Commission, 2008b), the European
Commission introduced Joint Programming as one of the five initiatives to implement the
ERA. As the title of the communication implies, the Joint Programming Initiative (JPI) aims
to tackle common European societal challenges by combining national efforts and make better
use of the limited research resources to meet common challenges.
According to the Commission, the initiative is a voluntary partnership between Member and
Associated States to engage in “[…] the definition, development and implementation of
common strategic research agendas based on a common vision of how to address major
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societal challenges.” (European Commission, 2008b, p. 8) It aims to increase the efficiency
and impact of national research funding in strategic areas. Whether it is done through strategic
collaboration between already existing national programmes or setting up entirely new ones
through joint efforts, “[..,] it entails putting resources together, selecting or developing the
most appropriate instrument(s), implementing, and collectively monitoring and reviewing
progress.” (European Commission, 2008b, p. 8)
The Communication clearly states that Joint Programming is not a mere relabeling exercise. It
is “[…] concerned with changing the structure of the European research landscape”
(European Commission, 2008b, p. 8) and “Joint Programming has the potential to become a
mechanism that is at least as important as the Framework Programmes in the European
research landscape, and to actually change the way in which Europeans think about
research” (European Commission, 2008b, p. 2).This is an ambitious goal that requires
commitment and actions from Member and Associated States to reach. To be successful, the
communication states, Member States have to rethink and reorganise their national
programmes. This possible intervention in national research and innovations systems is one of
the reasons why the Joint Programming is a voluntary process (European Commission,
2008b).
Following the communication on Joint Programming, the initiative was launched as a
Member States driven process that is supported by the Commission. The possible themes for
joint programming are to be selected following a broad consultation process, involving the
different regional, national and European scientific communities as well as other public or
private stakeholders where appropriate (High Level Group on Joint Programming, 2010a). A
High Level Group for Joint Programming (GPC) was set up to implement the JPI process. It
is the GPC that is responsible for selecting the JPIs, while the Commission has chosen to be a
partner in them because of the high level of commitment from member states. The GPC
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consists of representatives of Member States, associated states and the Commission. They
were tasked with identifying the themes for the JPIs and the development of voluntary
guidelines for Framework Conditions (High Level Group on Joint Programming, 2010a). A
JPI pilot on Neurodegenerative Diseases was adopted in 2009 and the first wave of Member
State initiatives were adopted by the Commission in 2010.
The Framework conditions set up by the GPC in the Voluntary Guidelines on Framework
Conditions for Joint Programming are concerned with the administrative, normative and
regulative factors deemed essential for the implementation of the JPIs (High Level Group on
Joint Programming, 2010a). The GPC is also concerned with the need to avoid a one size fits
all approach to the framework conditions. The JPI process should stay a flexible and non-
prescriptive approach and the GPC have suggested 2-3 models for each condition (High Level
Group on Joint Programming, 2010a). In the guidelines themselves they mention that “[…]
striking the right balance between developing a “standard model” and “flexibility within the
model” is crucial to prevent a fragmented landscape deriving from applying a completely
different set of rules to each initiative.” (High Level Group on Joint Programming, 2010b, p.
4) However, as one of my informants pointed out: “These JPIs have all emerged in different
ways and the governance of each JPI depends upon what countries initiated them and the
background.”(Agency, my translation) In this way they are already a bit fragmented, but the
JPIs are an overarching structure and the range of instruments used by the JPIs in variable
geometry will be the same and no more fragmented than what is already out there.
4.1.1 Funding structures
As the JPI is mainly about member states pulling together and defining common strategies,
the individual JPIs themselves don’t involve funding from the European Community
(European Commission, 2008b). However, some funds have been made available for the
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development of the JPIs through Coordination and Support Actions from the EU framework
programme, and Horizon 2020 will also have a connection to the JPIs. The EU envisages
three ways that they can take part in the JPIs: one is to set up calls that are relevant for the
JPIs, the second is through the ERA-NET initiative, and the third is as a committed partner in
art.185 initiatives. As seen in the communication on Horizon 2020:
Where the challenge addressed by a JPI is in line with the priorities of Horizon 2020,
ERA-NET or co-funding may be used to provide further support. New Article 185 initiatives
will only be considered provided there is a clear commitment from the Member States and
when a JPI has demonstrated its capacity for significant collaboration and the scale and
scope needed to support full integration of national programmes. (European Commission,
2011b, p. 13)
However, as one of my informants stressed:
JPIs are not a new pot, they are first and foremost 60% coordination of existing
national activities and 40% common research on new issues. (Agency, my translation)
and
The JPIs can be seen as an overarching structure coordinating relevant activities. A
JPI can identify four or five areas or work packages and there can already be existing
activities within these areas funded on a national level, by ERA- NETs or the Framework
programme, and they will be coordinated. In areas where there are no existing activities, new
calls can be organized. It is a bit of a puzzle to get it all in place. (Agency, my translation)
This is why a mapping process is an important part of the early stages of the JPI; they need to
find out who is working on what and where. The Scientific Research Agendas of the JPIs will
be important to determine the relevance of the different initiatives within the JPI to national
and EU strategies, so they can determine what actions are relevant for them to take part in.
In the guidelines for the JPI, the GPC has not included a preferred instrument or funding
model for joint research funding. However, I asked one of the Norwegian members to the
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GPC this question and his answer was a virtual common pot with top-up funding from the
EC.
Because of the economic situation in Europe more and more countries are turning off
the tap when it comes to national funding, they say that we have to pay our membership fee to
the EU to take part in the Framework programme and we want most of that back for the JPIs
as well. So one operates with a model where 30% of the funds for joint calls in the JPIs come
from the EC (Agency, my translation)
The JPIs have chosen different approaches to the funding of activities, as my three cases
show. Some have a focus on the strategic impact and coordination of institutionalised funds,
while others have started new networking initiatives or are working on new calls. An
important concept for the funding of the JPIs is the variable-geometry of initiatives and
activities (European Commission, 2008b). The principle of variable geometry means that
countries can participate voluntarily in the different actions on the basis of their financial and
political commitments (FACCE, 2012a).
4.1.2 Norway
In Norway, the JPIs are organised according to the sector responsibility principle. Norway is
a member of all the ten JPIs and each of them is anchored in one of the ministries as well as a
funding programme in the Research Council, apart from the JPI for Microbial Challenge,
which is anchored in the Norwegian Institute of Public Health instead of the Research
Council. However, the broad themes of the JPIs affect more than one ministry and one
programme in the Research Council (Research Council of Norway, 2012). In this thesis I will
focus on three different JPIs; Agriculture, Food Security and Climate Change (FACCE),
Healthy and Productive Seas and Oceans (OCEANS) and Cultural Heritage and Global
Change (JPICH). FACCE and JPIHC were among the first themes to be selected by the GPC
in 2009, and the initiatives were adopted by the commission in 2010 (High Level Group on
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Joint Programming, 2010a). Norway has been a member of FACCE from the start, but they
were only observers in JPIHC and did not become full members until July 2011. OCEANS
was part of the second wave of JPIs and was initiated by Norway in cooperation with Spain
and Belgium (Research Council of Norway, 2012). There is no reason to assume that the
motives for participation and levels of involvement neither financial nor political are the same
in all ten JPIs, and I chose these three to see just how different they are. My focus in this
thesis is on the motivation and funding aspects of the JPIs. I will now give brief descriptions
of the background and governance structures of the three JPIs before I go on to discuss the
Norwegian angle.
4.2 Agriculture, Food Security and Climate Change
4.2.1 Background
Agriculture, Food Security and Climate Change (FACCE) originated from a foresight
exercise by the Standing Committee on Agricultural Research (SCAR). The member states
and associated countries of SCAR identified food security and climate change as two of the
main challenges to impact European agriculture, and following discussions in the European
Agricultural Research Initiative (EURAGRI) in 2009, the two were combined to one topic;
Agriculture, Food Security and Climate change (FACCE, 2012b). Agriculture3 depends on
climatic conditions; small changes in the environment can have grave consequences for crop
yields. This is not just a European challenge but also a global one. Agriculture in tropical and
sub-tropical areas is especially vulnerable, and a food crisis here will affect Europe
demographically and economically, either directly or indirectly. The global food crisis in
2007/2008 was a sharp reminder of the need to build more resilient food systems to handle
expected and unexpected events ahead. “Due to population growth, urbanization and
3 The agricultural sector includes crops, livestock, fisheries, forest, biomass and commodities.
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increasing affluence in parts of the developing world” (FACCE, 2009, p. 2), there is an
expected increase in food demand globally. As well as being affected by climatic change,
agriculture also affects the climate. Agriculture has the possibility of mitigating greenhouse
gas emissions, and changing land use can either store more carbon in soil and plants or release
it (FACCE, 2009). These are interrelated challenges and need a trans-disciplinary research
base. In addition to scientific aspects, economic and social ones are also needed, and multiple
actors and stakeholders will be involved (FACCE, 2012a). FACCE’s mission is “[…] to
achieve, support and promote integration, alignment and joint implementation of national
resources under a common research and innovation strategy to address the diverse
challenges in agriculture, food security and climate change.” (FACCE, 2012a, p. 1)
France, UK, Italy, Germany and Spain proposed the topic supported by a number of
EURAGRI member states, among them Norway (FACCE, 2009, 2012b). The JPI was
officially launched in January 2010 with the first meeting of the Governing Board (FACCE,
2012b). There are currently 21 members in the JPI, and SCAR and the Commission are
observers in the governing board. The secretariat is situated in Paris and lead by France
(Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique, INRA) and the UK (Biotechnology and
Biological Sciences Research Council, BBSRC) (FACCE, 2012b).
4.2.2 Governance
FACCE’s permanent governance structure was adopted in February 2012. It consists of a
Governing Board, Scientific Advisory Board, Stakeholder Advisory Board and the
Secretariat. The Governing Board is the decision making body of FACCE and each
participating state is represented by a maximum of two representatives (FACCE, 2012c). The
Scientific Advisory Board is an advisory body; their role is to provide advice to the
Governing Board on the alignment of activities to the Scientific Research Agenda and updates
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of this, the identification, evaluation and impact of the JPI’s activities, and review the
scientific outputs from the JPI activities (FACCE, 2012c). At the time of writing the
Stakeholder Advisory Group is being constituted and their first meeting is scheduled for
September 2012 (FACCE, 2012d). The role of the Stakeholder Advisory Board is to be the
main forum for stakeholders to interact with FACCE and provide advice on the alignment of
FACCE activities to stakeholder needs. The members are European and International
organisations or initiatives (FACCE, 2012c).
4.2.3 Funding
The members of the Governing Board have to pay a non-refundable fee to take part in
FACCE, which goes towards the administration of the JPI and not funding of projects. In
2011, FACCE received a Coordination and Support Action from the Commission, covering
the period from 2011 to 2014. The Coordination and Support Action is to support and develop
the management and governance structure of the JPI (FACCE, 2012b). Existing EU
instruments will be an important part of the JPI (FACCE, 2012a).
The first joint action undertaken by FACCE is the FACCE JPI Knowledge Hub. Inspired by
the Commission’s Networks of Excellence instrument and the Nordic Centre of Excellence,
the call text defines the Knowledge hub as “[…] a network consisting of selected research
groups from JPI member countries within a defined area of research.” (FACCE, 2011, p. 6)
The title of the pilot call is A detailed climate change risk assessment for European
agriculture and food security. In addition to network building, the knowledge hub also has
elements of researcher mobility and knowledge building, and will collaborate with
international projects that are already running4 (FACCE, 2011). 17 countries took part in the
call that was a two stage procedure that led to one proposal, and the Knowledge hub was
4 “e.g. AgMIP (Agricultural Modelling Inter-comparison and Improvement Project;
http://www.agmip.org).” (FACCE, 2011, p. 3)
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launched in June 2012 (FACCE, 2012b). FACCE is currently working on an ERA-NET Plus
call that is going to be a Virtual Common Pot.
4.2.4 Norway
The Ministry of Agriculture and Food has the main responsibility for FACCE in Norway.
However, FACCE covers fields of interest for other ministries as well, and there are plans to
keep them informed and possibly involve them more (Research Council of Norway, 2012).
For the time being, FACCE is being handled by resources connected to BIONÆR (the
Sustainable Innovation in Food and Bio-based Industries programme), but it is felt that it
should not be the responsibility of just one programme. Rather, it should have a cross-
divisional organisation because it is relevant for several other national programmes. Some
funds were set aside from relevant programmes early in the process to be used for the first
calls within this JPI.
4.3 Cultural Heritage and Global Change
4.3.1 Background
This JPI was initiated by Italy and supported by 13 other countries, and had a strong link to
several existing ERA-NETs (Research Council of Norway, 2012). As stated in the proposal
(JPICH, 2009b) this theme is a key European challenge because cultural heritage is important
for the identity of many European citizens. The cultural heritage and the tourism industry that
it generates are also important for the European economy, making it important to generate
knowledge related to sustainable use and protection. The knowledge generated in Europe
related to cultural heritage is also seen as an important export article (JPICH, 2009b).
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The proposal for Cultural Heritage and Global Change (JPICH, 2009b) identified three
complex challenges related to cultural heritage. The first one is related to how climate change
impacts tangible cultural heritage5, both how the effects of catastrophic events affect cultural
heritage, how cultural heritage can open up new avenues for mitigating climate change
through re-learning old techniques and traditions, and sustainable use of sites (JPICH, 2009b).
The second challenge is related to security and the protection of cultural heritage, wherein
both environmental and anthropic risk factors must be taken into account. Sustainable
development and sustainable access to cultural heritage is important. The third challenge is
related to culture and society. Cultural heritage is the history and memory of the multifaceted
European society and therefore important for the European identity. Managed properly it can
contribute to social and economic stability (JPICH, 2009a).
4.3.2 Governance
JPICH has a three-layered governance structure consisting of a Governance Board, Executive
Board and a number of Task forces. They are supported by a Coordination structure and two
advisory committees; the Scientific Committee and the Advisory board. This structure was
implemented in 2010 (JPICH, 2010b). Each participating country can have up to two
representatives in the Governing Board, but they have only one official spokesperson and one
vote. The Executive board is responsible for the management and implementation of the
General Board’s decisions, and consists of one technical representative from each member
country (JPICH, 2010b). The Executive Board is structured into working groups and task
forces that report to the General Board. While in the process of writing the Scientific
Research Agenda for JPICH, they are organised horizontally and focused on the different
work packages, e.g. Work Group State of the Art and Work Group Monitoring. The Task
5 For example historic cities and towns, historical landscapes, archaeological sites, ancient buildings, museum
collections, archives and libraries.
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Forces are responsible for the different research areas and will work to implement the
Scientific Research Agenda and the Action Programme (JPICH, 2010b). The Scientific
research agenda is under development and will be finished in December 2012 (JPICH, 2012).
The Advisory Board consists of representatives from relevant European and international
bodies and the Scientific Committee consists of 12 experts selected through peer review
(JPICH, 2010b).
4.3.3 Funding
Like FACCE, JPICH has received a Coordination and Support Action from the commission to
run the secretariat and develop the JPI further. JPICH plans to utilise the wide variety of
funding options available and has through the ERA-NET NETHERITAGE already obtained a
good overview of existing research programmes and funding mechanisms. They aim to put a
lot of effort into linking up already existing activities and research communities, including
ERA-NETS, Infrastructure and European Technology platforms (JPICH, 2010a). JPICH is in
the process of developing its first application for an ERA-NET Plus call.
4.3.4 Norway
The Ministry of the Environment is responsible for JPICH. They have delegated the handling
of it to the Directorate of Cultural Heritage. Within the Research Council it is administered by
the programme MILJØ2015 (Norwegian environmental research towards 2015). This
programme has set aside funds for international research cooperation, and some of these funds
will be available for joint calls within this JPICH (Research Council of Norway, 2012).
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4.4 Healthy and Productive Seas and Oceans
4.4.1 Background
The initiators of this JPI were Spain, Belgium and Norway. It was further supported by eight
Member States and several stakeholder organisations (JPI Oceans, 2010). The Proposal (JPI
Oceans, 2010) and vision document (JPI Oceans, 2011c) for Healthy and Productive Seas and
Oceans (OCEANS) points out the importance of seas and oceans for Europe’s wealth and the
wellbeing of its citizens. This mainly undiscovered territory also offers a huge potential
through the largely unexplored marine biodiversity and marine energy. The vision document
links this to the EU2020 vision where “It [Europe] must ensure the sustainability of existing
maritime activities and turn the unexploited potential of seas and oceans into sustainable
growth and jobs.” (JPI Oceans, 2011c, p. 6) However, the coastlines and marine environment
are under pressure from human activity and natural hazards, ranging from overcrowded
coastlines, overfishing, oil spills and pollution from land based industry to invasion of foreign
species through global transport and the effects of climate change (JPI Oceans, 2010). These
challenges are truly cross border; they are not constrained by any legal boundary, and put the
whole marine environment at risk. These challenges cannot be tackled by one state or sector
alone, “They require an integrated approach and should be based on sound knowledge.” (JPI
Oceans, 2011c, p. 6) OCEANS’ Vision document (JPI Oceans, 2011c) states clearly that their
aim is to strengthen the knowledge base and, by sharing best practises, create a coherence to
European research through data harmonisation and standardisation of techniques, methods
and tools. To handle these challenges, existing infrastructure needs continued support and
development, and researchers, technicians and engineers need a framework to support the
necessary capacity building (JPI Oceans, 2011a, 2011c). They also aim to build on existing
initiatives like ERA-NETs, the Framework Programme and European Technology Platforms
and create a convergence between them, “[..,] with a view to produce the necessary
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integrated knowledge that is needed by policy makers and industries to ensure an integrated
and sustainable development of sea based activities.” (JPI Oceans, 2011c, p. 13)
4.4.2 Governance
OCEANS will have a similar governance structure as FACCE and JPICH, with a
Management Board on top as the decision making body, a Strategic Advisory Board that, as
the name implies, acts as an independent and neutral advisor, and an Executive Committee
that prepares and implements the decisions made by the Management Board. They are all
supported by a secretariat that runs the day to day management of the JPI (JPI Oceans,
2011b). Only the Management Board and the Secretariat are in place at the time of writing.
The Management Board consists of up to two representatives from each participating state,
and as with the other JPIs each state only has one vote. They are in the process of setting up
the other bodies in the governance structure and developing a Strategic Research and
Innovation Agenda (Research Council of Norway, 2012). The participating states are
expected to make an active contribution to the activities in the JPI. The Secretariat was set up
early in the process of the JPI to facilitate the development and is run by personnel seconded
from several of the participating countries. The secretariat leader is Norwegian (Research
Council of Norway, 2012).
Unlike FACCE and JPIHC that have two advisory boards, OCEANS will have one that “[…]
consists of scientists, industrial stakeholders and technologists and societal stakeholders.”
(JPI Oceans, 2011b, p. 7) The stakeholders in OCEANS seem to have a more direct
interaction with the governance of the JPI. As it says in the Vision document “The JPI will
foster a science- policy-NGO-industry P-P-P-P dialog, bringing stakeholders into the
governance structure. The JPI in order to achieve its goal sees the need to take stakeholder
involvement to a next step of involvement in the implementation phase.” (JPI Oceans, 2011c,
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p. 15) Securing commitment and engagement from stakeholders through a dialogue with the
end-users is seen as important for the JPI to be sustainable and fulfil the societal needs and
challenges it was set up to tackle (JPI Oceans, 2011b).
4.4.3 Funding
In 2011 the Commission opened up a call for a Coordination and Support Action for JPI
Oceans and it is expected that it will be approved during 2012. The funds from the
Coordination and Support Action will be used to further develop the JPI both strategically and
organisationally (Research Council of Norway, 2012). There is a small fee to participate, but
Norway carries most of the cost to run the secretariat in Brussels (Research Council of
Norway, 2012). Out of the three JPIs that I have looked at, OCEANS is the one that most
clearly states their intention to use institutionalised funding in the JPI. The vision document
declares that funding “[…] may include institutional, project-related or new funds.” (JPI
Oceans, 2011c, p. 7) This was also supported by my informants.
4.4.4 Norway
The Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs has the main responsibility for OCEANS. An
interdepartmental group with representatives from 7 other ministries is set up to discuss the
Norwegian activities in this JPI. There are several national programmes within the Research
council that are relevant for OCEANS, and as the main responsibility is not within one
programme, they have hired a new person to handle the coordination towards the relevant
programmes. In addition to Norway’s contribution of significant funds to the running of the
secretariat in Brussels, it has also been partly staffed by the Research Council along with
secondments from other participating countries. So far there has not been identified any funds
for joint calls (Research Council of Norway, 2012).
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4.5 What motives come into play when policy
makers decide to take part in the JPIs?
As mentioned earlier, Norway is now a member of all the ten existing Joint Programming
Initiatives. Not being a member of the EU, Norway has in some instances struggled to be
heard while in others Norway is considered one of the leaders. This can also be seen in
Norway’s involvement with the JPIs.
In the GPC (2010a) report, some of the issues that were highlighted were member state
commitment, the different capacity of regions and countries to participate and the possibility
that this could accentuate the scientific divide between member states (High Level Group on
Joint Programming, 2010a). This concern is also echoed by Langfeldt et al. (2012), who note
that policy instruments in small countries might not be able to handle the diversity and
complexity of the new ERA instruments. The GPC (2010a) report notes that these issues can
be eased by the principles of variable-geometry and the use of institutional funding.
4.5.1 European influence
What I have found interesting is the fact that limited resources and low priority settings can
also be a motive for participating in a JPI, as in the case of Norway’s participation in JPICH.
According to my informants this was the JPI that took the longest consideration for Norway to
join. There are not a lot of research funds for Cultural Heritage in Norway, and Norway was
reluctant to use these funds on joint calls. At first Norway attended a few meetings in the JPI
as an observer and eventually they decided to join as a full member. “[…] it was the
Directorate of Cultural Heritage that had the strongest desire to join.” (Agency, my
translation) It was felt that because Norway is a small country when it comes to research on
Cultural Heritage it was important for them to have access to other countries’ knowledge
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bases, and this is the first real opportunity that Norway has had to influence the European
research agenda when it comes to cultural heritage. As one of my informants put it:
There has been some work done on this earlier but this is the first big coordination
and we can’t not take part. If we don’t, we risk being left sitting in the corner watching while
the others play. (Ministry, my translation)
and
There have been few [European] funds and projects that have been relevant for us up
through the years. (Ministry, my translation)
Because they came in late in the process, Norway does not have an official role within the
work packages. Only the countries that were members when the Coordination and Support
Action was set up, do, which is why it is important that the latecomers work hard to get
involved. The fact that there are no set tasks for newcomers in the work packages is in many
ways a disadvantage, but Norway has turned this around and volunteered to assist where it is
of the most interest to them. After becoming a full member, Norway has become involved in
the Work Package that is dedicated to the development of the strategic agenda, working
closely with the other Nordic countries and the UK, who is the work package leader.
While access to networks, new relationships and the chance to angle the grand challenges
towards Norwegian issues is an important driver for participating in JPICH, there is also an
economic one:
It has been quite difficult to acquire EC funding for Cultural Heritage research
throughout the years. So with this new initiative from the EU where the funds will in principle
go through these JPIs it was something that MD [the Norwegian Ministry of the
Environment] and the Directorate for Cultural Heritage agreed to connect to. (Ministry, my
translation)
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However, they are dependent on the Strategic Research Agenda to have themes that cover
Norwegian issues and that there will be calls that are relevant for the Norwegian research
community.
OCEANS, on the other hand, is within an area that is strongly prioritised by Norway, and it
was originally a Norwegian initiative. However, the initiators acknowledged the fact that
Norway is not a member of the EU and therefore needed to join forces with others. As it was
Spain and Belgium that held the EU presidency in 2010, they were approached and asked to
develop and initiate the JPI with Norway. As one of my informants put it, “We came in an
initiating position, a leadership position, because we had ambitions in this area and found
allies in Spain and Belgium to carry it forward” (Ministry, my translation)
This little detail shows how strategically Norway has worked with this JPI from the
beginning. Norwegian research strategy has the ambition to lift Norwegian marine research
both in scope, resources and international cooperation, and EU funding instruments are
important tools to do so (Meld. St. 30 (2008-2009), 2009). My informant at the Ministry of
Fisheries and Coastal Affairs was very clear that their aim with the JPI was to both strengthen
the research communities in the competition for Framework funding and to make better use of
the existing infrastructure.
Norway pays large fees to the EU and in connection with HORIZON 2020 we will
contribute even more, therefore it is important for us to position ourselves to regain as much
of it as possible.[…] Participation in JPI OCEANS will facilitate this and facilitate research
cooperation across Europe. (Ministry, my translation)
This positioning towards HORIZON 2020 is an important part of OCEANS, and much of the
work so far has been strategic. The focus has been on developing the governance and
structure of the JPI as well as working on developing a good network and access to key
personnel within the development of marine research in the EU, especially towards those
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working on HORIZON 2020. My informant at the Research Council noted that there is some
uncertainty regarding how the relationship between the JPIs and HORIZON 2020 will
develop.
People are a bit afraid that HORIZON 2020 will be disconnected from the JPI themes,
saying that they are handled by the JPIs so we do not need to include them. But what most
hope and believe is that they will go together and complement one another. And our
impression from working so closely in these processes is that we are being listened to.
(Agency, my translation)
OCEANS has branded themselves a player on the marine policy field and seem to have
impact and influence, however it still remains to be seen if they actually do. As my informant
noted, “It will be interesting to see what actually ends up in HORIZON 2020” (Agency, my
translation)
4.5.2 Strengthening research communities
Apart from influencing the EU policy makers to develop a theme within HORIZON 2020 that
corresponds to OCEANS, they also aim to strengthen the marine research communities
through closer cooperation and better use of existing infrastructure. “If one through close
cooperation between countries, between research institutes and universities in the different
countries manages to become more competitive in regards to the framework programmes,
then that will definitely be a positive spin-off.”(Ministry, my translation)
On a direct question, my informant at the ministry answered that the main motive for
Norwegian participation is to strengthen the research communities and regain funds from the
Framework programme. This implies that the concept of fair return is a strong motive for
participation.
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Norway was also one of the initiators for FACCE through their involvement in SCAR. The
Research Council represents Norway in SCAR, and it was the Research Council that
approached the Ministry and suggested taking part in the JPI. For the ministry, this JPI fit
very well with the national strategy and priorities within this field and the White paper on
research (Meld. St. 30 (2008-2009)). As my informant at the Ministry of Agriculture and
Food put it:
It follows up the goals we have in the white paper on research, that we shall
contribute to tackle the global challenges, and especially food security and climate is
important […] and sustainability. (Ministry, my translation)
and
It is also a government decision that we shall go international, to become more
international in the context of research. (Ministry, my translation)
My informant also noted that these are big challenges that have to be handled together with
other countries; they cannot be solved by one country alone and it is important to take part,
both to contribute resources and knowledge and also to gain access to knowledge. Influence is
also mentioned as a motive. As the research strategy for the Ministry of Agriculture and Food
states: “It is also important to influence so that international research has relevance for
Norwegian issues” (Meld. St. 9 (2011-2012), p. 284, my translation)
The high level participation in the JPI was mentioned as important because it lifts the issues
up to a higher policy level, and makes them more visible. By having a representative from the
ministry in the JPI it gives them a direct sense of what is going on, they have their finger on
the pulse, so to speak. This means that the whole ministry can be informed and involved in a
more direct way in these high level policy issues. However, as was also pointed out, it is still
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early in the process. Knowledge about the JPI still has to be spread in the ministry, and it has
to be further anchored.
4.5.3 Return
The STIG group notes that fair return is an important policy issue when dealing with
international cooperation; national governments want to make sure that they get a return on
their investments. Therefore, policies designed to ensure a fair return are common in
intergovernmental STI activities. (OECD, 2012) However, they also note that “[…] to
address global challenges, the principle of fair return must most likely be tempered.” (OECD,
2012, p. 179) My informants have expressed similar views, but my cases show little evidence
of such tempering.
The Norwegian motives for participation are linked to social, scientific and economic drivers.
For both JPICH and OCEANS the chance to influence and set the agenda are important
drivers for participation, while for FACCE this is less explicit. It is also important for JPICH
and FACCE to gain access to other research communities and more knowledge. OCEANS is
the one that has expressed the strongest economic driver. The motive for participating in
FACCE seems to be less driven by specific needs for networking or strategic work and more
by the Grand Challenges and the need to develop knowledge in cooperation with others to
face them. However, influence and relevance for Norwegian actors is an underlying motive,
as seen in the White Papers. One of my informants also pointed out the value of getting to
know each other’s strategies and funding instruments, that coordination is more than joint
calls. Three other informants also pointed out the importance of the sharing of strategies and
that the JPI will be important for the development of future national strategies.
It seems that some form of return is a driver for all the three JPIs. The needs of the ministries’
national sectors are important, but they have managed to frame them within a global
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objective. This relates to the goal conflict issue. For national actors to actually get some return
on their investment, they have to manage to influence the Strategic Research Agenda of the
JPI so that it is of relevance to them.
Regardless of whether this return is more funds, more knowledge or more influence, it implies
that return is an important driver. To find out more about return as a motive I was interested in
my informants’ thoughts on real common pot. In the White paper Klima for Forskning (Meld.
St. 30 (2008-2009)), the Norwegian government listed several measures to improve the
Norwegian research cooperation with Europe. One of them was for the Norwegian Research
Council to investigate the legal and administrative implications of a real common pot funding
model within the ERA framework (Meld. St. 30 (2008-2009)). So far the Research Council
has started to look at the practical and organisational consequences of more international
cooperation; however they have not looked specifically at the real common pot issues yet.
When asked about real common pot, five of the nine informants said that if the knowledge is
important enough they could see Norway agreeing to such an arrangement. One of these five
even went as far as to say that a real common pot was the only way to get real impact by
getting the best researchers and research communities to tackle the common challenges. Two
of the others said that it is too early to say and the last two noted that there is no indication
that Norway would want to accept a real common pot.
Of course, when we have gotten further and are more secure of the system and have a
more integrated wish regarding the knowledge development, then we can possibly say that
within this field we do not have a knowledge base but the knowledge is important therefore we
will put money into a real common pot. However we are not there yet and I think that most
countries are more comfortable with a virtual common pot. (Agency, my translation)
My informant from the Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs noted that
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It is difficult to say how Norway would position itself regarding Real Common Pot.
The sector ministries would want fresh funds to be able to do it. This would actualize a more
general JPI discussion for all the ministries, if one receives fresh funds they all want some.
[…] It is more likely that existing schemes and funds that are already in the system will be
used. (Ministry, my translation)
This is important not only regarding the use of a real common pot, but to the whole question
of funding activities within the JPIs. The three JPIs I have looked at have chosen three
different approaches, all utilising the funds that are already in the system.
4.6 How are the national budgets used in
cooperation with other countries in the JPI?
It was important for the Research Council that the JPIs have their own budget lines in the
national budget, so the ministries would have a conscious grasp of the funding situation. As
one informant said:
Early on we thought that the JPIs should have their own budgets, as if they were
national programmes, and the reason for that was so that they showed up with budget lines in
the budget that we present the to the ministries, and then it will be up to them how much they
want to invest in them, and not the national program committees. (Agency, my translation)
However, with the new International strategy the national programmes have a stronger
responsibility to identify and take part in relevant international research cooperation,
including the JPIs. Isolating the budget lines too much from the national programmes might
hinder them from taking part in JPI activities.
The ministries have so far not prioritised funds to JPI activities, but the government’s research
strategy Klima for Forskning (Meld. St. 30 (2008-2009)) and the grant letters from the
ministries to the Research council state the importance of international research cooperation.
For instance, in the grant letter from the Norwegian Ministry of Agriculture and Food, it says
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The Research Council shall target their efforts so that it supports Norwegian
agriculture and food policy. An important part of this is to continue to develop the sector’s
participation in international research cooperation. It is important to solve common
challenges, raise the level of research, renew Norwegian research and understand and utilize
research results from other countries. (Landbruks- og Matdepartementet, 2012, p. 4, my
translation)
The Research Council is the ministry’s agent and the ministry expects the Research Council
to prioritise within the existing budgets in line with the ministry’s strategy. This means that
the Research Council has to create room to manoeuvre within the grants that the relevant
programmes have. They have to identify the relevant programmes and set aside a certain
amount for a certain period. This means that the programme boards will only be able to
distribute the funds that are left after the funds for the JPI is taken out.
We have to get the national programme boards to accept this. They are put in place by
the research council to give grants to Norwegian actors and they are not the ones who wanted
to take part in the JPIs, they have no sense of ownership towards them, so it will be a big
exercise to get them on board. (Agency, my translation)
4.6.1 New Calls
This has been done in the case of JPICH. The relevant national research programme involved
the programme board in the discussion a few years ago and they set aside a lump sum to be
used for international cooperation. This lump sum has been divided among one ERA-NET
and three JPIs relevant for this programme, and the funds are still controlled by the
programme. “This means that we have some money within a zero growth budget for these
JPIs, and if we hadn’t done that we would have been penniless in the current budget
situation.”(Agency, my translation) With these funds Norway can take part in the JPICH pilot
call currently being developed.
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The funds that are used in the FACCE Knowledge hub call and the upcoming ERA-NET Plus
call have been set aside by the Research council after a dialogue with the Ministry, and
released by relevant national research programmes. When I asked the Ministry of Agriculture
and Food if they would prioritise the JPI, the answer I got was that this is something they will
have to consider in the future. For now: “The ministry sends all its research funds to the
Research Council. And all decisions regarding grants and calls are taken by the Research
council” (Ministry, my translation) However, they referred to the close dialogue they have
with the Research Council, and with the Ministry represented in the Governing Board of the
JPI, they are able to follow the process closely and can act if needed.
4.6.2 Institutionalised funds
As noted earlier, OCEANS has a strong focus on institutionalised funds and utilising the
infrastructure with guidelines and instructions on when to use them and where to cooperate.
The funds are already in the system; the trick is to direct them towards cooperation and joint
activities. It is thought that 85 % of the whole European research budget is institutionalised
and not subject to competition (JPI Oceans, 2011c) so if one could align these funds and the
on-going research one could get a real impact. The ministry has so far not directed the
institutes on their use of resources, but as my source at the ministry noted: “They [the
institutes]see what is coming and they have taken the initiative […]we have not come far
enough for it to be natural for the Ministry to go in and direct” (Ministry, my translation)
It is expected that there will be some joint calls, but the main focus on calls will be within the
Framework Programme and ERA-NETs. While there so far haven’t been reserved any funds
for new calls within this JPI, it is thought that the financing of these future calls could come
from several sources, both national and in the EU. The themes within the JPI are relevant for
several national programmes, and the marine research is already quite internationally oriented.
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As one of my informants put it, “There are no real borders to the marine and oceans, it all
floats around.” (Agency, my translation)
4.6.3 Goal conflict and moral hazard
One of the main governance challenges in STI cooperation programmes is funding and the
funding module chosen in each programme. (OECD, 2012) This can be especially challenging
with the variable geometry of the JPIs. The Joint programming initiative is a Bottom-up
process in the European perspective, in that it is a member/associate state driven process.
However, when it comes to the JPIs themselves, it is a top down process; they are policy
driven and have a high-level political commitment from the participants. The members of the
Management or Governing Boards are high level representatives that have a government
mandate to commit funds to the JPI (FACCE, 2012c; JPI Oceans, 2011b; JPICH, 2010b).
All of the JPIs have a strong socioeconomic aspect. This means that they are in part societally
driven and therefore it is important that stakeholders are involved to enhance the social value
of the research initiatives. The links to scientists through the scientific and strategic advisory
boards are also important. As Van der Meulen (1998) points out; if one can build up a
consensus between policy makers, scientists and other stakeholders, the urge to shirk will be
lessened. By having experts and important stakeholder groups as part of the governance
structure, one can build a consensus among the actors, thereby lessening the moral hazard
related to the agents. The third part (here the scientific advisory board) in the triadic principal-
agent relationship can help the intermediary (here the JPI) to develop and improve its strategic
position. According to Van der Meulen (2003), focusing on the third part’s objectives allows
the intermediary to lessen the opportunistic behaviour of the principals and agents. Van der
Meulen (2003) also states that in addition to being well informed, it is essential that the
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arbitration of the third party is decisive. In the case of the JPIs, however, while the Scientific
Advisory Boards are well informed and their arbitration is important, it is not decisive. As the
quote below shows, they still allow the JPIs to focus on a scientific strategy that is not stifled
by national interests and lessen the goal conflict among the principals.
The Secretariat of FACCE JPI noted that focusing the discussion on scientific issues
facilitated national representatives’ agreement on the scientific research agenda. This was
also facilitated by the Scientific Advisory Board which is composed of well-known experts
from different world regions who are not constrained by specific national interests.
(Holzinger et al., 2012, p. 163)
The member states nominate and vote on members for the advisory boards. For there to be
trust in the system, there also has to be consensus among the policy makers on who should sit
on the different advisory boards. The members do not represent a state or institution, and the
fact that they act in an individual capacity free from affiliation is important in their role as
advisors. Even if they are independent and unconstrained by specific national interests, new
members that have been admitted to the Management Board after the process of reaching this
consensus may not have the same level of trust as the ones who took part in the process. If
this in turn is coupled with the variable-geometry of instruments and initiatives within a JPI
and it is not clearly defined who sets the criteria and makes the decisions regarding the
separate initiatives, it can add to the moral hazard.
In situations with multiple principals, which the JPIs are, the only way for the principal to be
sure that the funds are used according to their goals is to monitor them closely. One of the
ways this monitoring happens is by earmarking the funds (Van der Meulen, 2003). With the
JPIs that earmarking can be seen to be done through the variable geometry of the
programmes, but monitoring also requires a clear strategy, a work plan and clear definitions
of who decides what. When asked, one of my informants stated regarding JPICH that this was
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one of their concerns regarding their commitment of funds to the pilot call. The JPI wants
several members from the Scientific Board to steer the call. This is a concern for Norway,
because they became a member after the Scientific Board was appointed and therefore did not
have a say in who was appointed. “[..,] if we are to take part in this call it is important that
the countries committing the funds are the ones making the decisions” (Agency, my
translation) Also, the JPI has asked for preliminary commitments of funds before a theme has
been selected for the call, and before the Scientific Research Agenda is in place.
One of the concerns in the case study of FACCE done for the OECD report was: “Do
countries that will not participate in specific calls or joint actions also have the right to vote
on these issues? Do joint actions or activities depend on the agreement of members who will
then not participate in and support these actions?” (Holzinger et al., 2012, p. 161)
This was not sufficiently addressed in the preliminary Governing Structure of FACCE, but the
permanent one states that when it comes to suggestions for specific initiatives, the required
vote is: “[ ] any number of countries willing to participate is enough1” (FACCE, 2012c, p. 6,
footnote in original). A footnote further specifies that:
1 In any joint action involving less than the full number of FACCE-JPI participating
countries, decisions concerning that action will be the responsibility of the sub-set of
participating countries. A Steering Committee will be formed consisting of representatives of
countries involved in the action. The Steering Committee will be expected to report progress
on the action to the GB. (FACCE, 2012c, p. 6)
This means that the decision making body for a specific joint action only consists of
participants with a commitment to the action. Moral hazard issues are enhanced when there
are a lot of Principals, and if some of these principals do not have a financial commitment,
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there will also be an issue with free riders6. By clearly defining the decision making body,
FACCE has limited the free-riding and moral hazard issues. However, FACCE is the only one
of my cases that has clearly defined this decision level.
When it comes to JPICH, the Governing Board is responsible for the strategic orientation
which includes “Building up an “à la carte” program in which several countries in variable
geometry could participate voluntarily and on the basis of their political and financial
commitment.” (JPICH, 2010b, p. 2) The Terms of Reference of the management structure
(JPICH, 2010b) does not state what kind of majority is needed to initiate new activities. When
I asked one of my informants in the Governing Board, the answer was that “The Governing
Board decides that they want to launch a call, and then the members decide if they want to
take part and develop the call. When the theme and guidelines are in place the members
decide if they want to participate. ” (Agency, my translation)
JPICH are in the process of working this out now through the process of their first pilot call.
All the members were invited to submit suggestions for Call themes and state what
administrative criteria they have regarding funding, national processes and cooperation to
commit funding. A Memorandum of Understanding for the pilot call is being developed based
on the responses from the member countries. The choice of a virtual common pot as funding
model for the call helps to mitigate the moral hazard issue. As my informant noted:
We cannot commit without seeing the relevance for us. However we will always cover
ourselves because we will only be using our funds for our part of the projects, so if no
Norwegian researchers apply we will not use a single penny. So in that way we still have
control, and in a start-up phase I think that is good. (Agency, my translation)
6 The tendency of actors to reduce one’s own effort to produce the public good at the cost of others (Braun,
1993)
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JPI OCEANS are far behind in this process. With their main focus having been on the
strategic work, branding and institutional funding, they have not yet discussed these issues.
The Terms of Reference for JPI Oceans states that the vote needed for a new initiative is “Any
number of countries willing to participate.” (JPI Oceans, 2011b, p. 6) However, unlike
FACCE they do not specify who should be involved in the decisions concerning the
individual initiatives. Programming Boards are mentioned as part of the governance structure
in the Terms of Reference (JPI Oceans, 2011b), so one can assume that these will handle the
decisions concerning specific actions. When asked about this my informant in the
Management Board said that it was “Too early to say if the lower governance structure would
be organized thematically or on the basis of variable-geometry.” (Agency, my translation)
4.6.4 Adverse selection
Adverse selection is an interesting issue when it comes to using the institutionalised funds. As
mentioned earlier, in situations with several principals, earmarking the funds is one way of
lessening the moral hazard. However, when it comes to the institutional funds, this
earmarking can become a hindrance to get the right agents for the task, especially in situations
where almost all the funds in the research system are institutionalised.
The EU opening up for using institutionalised funds in ERA-NET activities implies that some
of the institutionalised funds can become subject to competition. How will the adverse
selection issue of earmarked versus peer review be handled in this situation? FACCE had to
find a way around this issue when setting up the Knowledge hub. At first it was planned as a
call with cash funding, but they discovered that not many of the countries wanting to
participate had available cash, because all their funds are institutionalised. Therefore they
ended up with a mix between cash and institutionalised funds. “But then the prerequisite had
to be that the partners that came with institutionalized funds were allowed to change what
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they were doing and make it fit with the project. And apparently that is what has happened”
(Agency, my translation)
It can seem like one solution is for the policy makers to give room in the grant letters to use
the institutionalised funding in ERA-NET projects. The direct involvement of the ministries in
the JPIs’ governance could ease the issue of information asymmetry and make it easier for
them to do exactly that. As one of my informants noted “It will be the institutes that have to
start thinking strategically with regards to where they use their institutional funding together
with others.” (Agency, my translation) As noted earlier by my informant at the ministry of
Fisheries and Coastal Affairs, their institutes have started to do so. By working strategically
with the JPI, the policy makers will be able to steer the relevance of the projects.
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5 Summary and conclusion
The aim of this thesis has been to explore some of the motives and governance issues related
to funding arrangements in international STI cooperation, by doing a comparative case study
of Norway’s participation in three JPIs.
To do this I asked the questions:
 What motives come into play when policy makers decide to take part in the JPIs?
 How are national budgets used in cooperation with other countries in the JPI?
5.1.1 Motivation
International STI cooperation is increasingly being seen as important to tackle the common
challenges, both globally and within the EU. The JPIs are set up to help generate knowledge
that authorities can use to handle the common challenges. It is reasonable to assume that
tackling the common challenges is part of the overall motive for the countries participating in
the JPIs. Framed within this overall objective are other national motives.
I found that my cases shared the general motives of influence, return both knowledge and
financial, and strengthening the domestic research community. The motives are set within the
broad paradigm of Boekholt et al. (2009), and as the white paper (Meld. St. 30 (2008-2009))
and EU strategy (Kunnskapsdepartementet, 2008) show, these motives are part of the general
Norwegian strategy. However, what motives are the strongest, varies. The opportunity to
influence and set the agenda is a very strong motive for both JPICH and OCEANS.
Particularly JPICH have recognised that participation in this initiative may be key to future
exchange and interaction for the policy makers. For OCEANS, the JPI is a specific tool to
influence international and European processes. The influence motive is less explicit for
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FACCE, but it is there. The one that expressed the strongest economic motive is OCEANS,
both to utilise the existing institutionalised funds better and to strengthen the competitiveness
of the domestic research community within the EU Framework programme. The motivation to
participate in FACCE seems to be more about return on knowledge and the general strategy of
the ministry rather than a specific strategic or networking need.
Because the variable geometry of the JPIs allows for countries to act on national interests
within a framework of global objectives, some of the tension between national and
international interests is eased. However, because funding influences who researches and
what, lack of funding in some countries can make new knowledge difficult to discover.
Influence being this central indicates that the goal conflict issue, the alignment of goals, is still
an important one.
5.1.2 Funding Structure
When it comes to my second research question, there is no clear answer. The JPIs are still
early in the process and they have not fully found their form yet. However, there are some
indications as to how the national budgets are used in cooperation with others within the JPI
framework. There are indications that coordination of institutionalised funding will become
more central, especially with the new ERA-NET instrument from the EC. As far as I have
found, the ministry handling OCEANS is the only one that has the use of institutionalised
funds as a clear strategy. With FACCE and JPICH it is still too early to say, as there is no
clear strategy regarding the JPI funding, apart from what is already delegated to the Research
Council. However, there are indications that they are following the situation closely. The new
calls that have been or are under development are all virtual common pot calls allowing
national funds to be used according to national rules, but there are still issues of moral hazard,
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goal conflict and adverse selection when it comes to the development and governance of the
individual actions.
The JPIs have several countries as principals, therefore the Scientific Research Agenda is
important to ease the goal conflict issues within the JPI. As seen with the JPICH case where
they have started to develop a call before the Scientific Research Agenda is agreed upon,
there have been concerns related to goal conflict. The setting up and governing of specific
actions raises moral hazard concerns. Even if the variable geometry does ease them some, it is
only FACCE that has taken direct steps to ease the moral hazard and free-rider issues related
to the decision making process of specific actions. Also, if the JPIs only use a virtual common
pot model, the variable geometry of the JPIs themselves can be a source of adverse selection,
regardless of the use of institutionalised funds or fresh funds. If participation in the individual
initiatives is only based on national resources, there is a possibility that this can hinder the
most appropriate or best research communities from taking part in a call and finding a
solution to the issue.
5.1.3 Implications for practice and further research
Looking at my cases, the JPIs represent opportunities that the policy-makers utilise on the
basis of their own situations. For instance, research on cultural heritage has not been a highly
prioritised area in Norway and now they finally have the opportunity to take part in the
European arena. This could in turn help to lift the visibility of this research nationally as well.
Marine research, on the other hand, is highly prioritised in Norway and the policy makers
have seen the possibilities inherent in the JPIs, which enable them to use this strength
internationally.
I also find indications in the cases that there is a connection between the existing level of
domestic funds and the will to use institutionalised funds. OCEANS, being within a highly
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prioritised sector, has more institutional funds than the others, which could imply that they
will have a larger effect of using the institutionalised funds. For cultural heritage research
there is less funds already in the system. Therefore one could reason that for Norwegian
JPICH involvement, there would be a bigger effect from receiving fresh funds than from
using the institutionalised funds. However, these are only tentative indications and one would
need more research to conclude.
In my opinion, what will be the most interesting to follow in the future is how
institutionalised funds will be used in calls that are subject to competition. How will the
policy makers, funding agencies and science communities handle this? Influence on the arena
that develops these activities can ease the national goal conflict by creating opportunities for
domestic actors, or through the creation of new knowledge that is needed. However, there will
still be moral hazard and adverse selection issues that have to be handled.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Original interview guide
To what degree and under what
conditions will Norway accept the use of
a real common pot within JPI
framework?
What are the thought of the governing Board
on funding models?
What model does the board prefer?
Opening up of national programmes?
The Involvement of industry in the JPI’s?
How?
Coordination of existing funding
What programmes will be affected
What has been done to prepare the
programmes
Assessing where the funds should be
channeled, JPI or national programs
Use of ERA net (real common pot)
Goal conflict
 Motivation
 Is it a political question or a science
question?
 Programs/science communities with a
strong international focus versus the
ones with a national focus.
 Strong / weak science communities
 Path dependency
 Where are the budgets found?
 What guidelines/conditions will the
ministries put on the basic funding to
institutes and universities, and
programs in the RCN?
Adverse selection
 Coordination of national actors and
stakeholders - How
 Is the Norwegian research community
ready for international competition?
 How can this be improved?
Posisjoneringsmidler?
Nettverksmidler?
Stimuleringsmidler?
 Ministries: Are they pro or reactive?
Moral hazard
 Interoperability
 Governance guidelines “optional”
 Common contracts/module based
contracts
 Evaluation
 Monitoring
 What rules will we accept?
 What rules will the EU accept?
 Legal aspects
How will the choice of funding model
influence the system?
(How will the JPIs influence the system?)
 What is the effect on
internationalization in general?
Goal conflict
 Strategic consequences
 Shift from single scientist strategy to
system/sector strategy?
 Do the ministries coordinate with
other countries? If so, how?
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6.2 Revised interview guide
How will we use national budgets in
cooperation with others?
What are the thoughts of the governing board
on funding models?
Where will the funds be found?
Opening up of national programmes?
Coordination of existing funding
Institutional funding
What programmes will be affected
What has been done to prepare the
programmes
Assessing where the funds should be
channelled, JPI or national programs?
Use of ERA net (real common pot)
Motive for participation
What is Norway’s goal?
How do you intend to reach this?
Will you adjust national politics?
The Involvement of industry in the JPI’s?
How?
Goal conflict
 Motivation
 Is it a political question or a science
question?
 Programs/science communities with a
strong international focus versus the
ones with a national focus.
 Strong / weak science communities
 Path dependency
 Where are the budgets found?
 What guidelines/conditions will the
ministries put on the basic funding to
institutes and universities, and
programs in the RCN?
Adverse selection
 Coordination of national actors and
stakeholders - How
 Is the Norwegian research community
ready for international competition?
 How can this be improved?
Posisjoneringsmidler?
Nettverksmidler?
Stimuleringsmidler?
 Ministries: Are they pro or reactive?
Moral hazard
 Interoperability
 Governance guidelines “optional”
 Common contracts/module based
contracts
 Evaluation
 Monitoring
 What rules will we accept?
 What rules will the EU accept?
 Legal aspects
How will the choice of funding model
influence the system?
(How will the JPIs influence the system?)
 What is the effect on
internationalization in general?
Goal conflict
 Strategic consequences
 Shift from single scientist strategy to
system/sector strategy?
 Do the ministries coordinate with
other countries? If so, how?
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